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PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION:  
PROTECTING LGBT STUDENTS 
FROM SCHOOL VOUCHER DISCRIMINATION 
Adam Mengler* 
 
More than a dozen states operate school voucher programs, which allow 
parents to apply state tax dollars to their children’s private school tuition.  
Many schools that participate in voucher programs are affiliated with 
religions that disapprove of homosexuality.  As such, voucher-accepting 
schools across the country have admissions policies that discriminate 
against LGBT students and students with LGBT parents.  Little recourse 
exists for students who suffer discrimination at the hands of voucher-
accepting schools. 
This Note considers two ways to provide protection from such 
discrimination for LGBT students and ultimately argues that the best route 
is for an LGBT student to bring a lawsuit under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Such a lawsuit would require a finding of “state action,” which U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence suggests would present a serious challenge for a 
plaintiff.  This Note suggests that plaintiffs should urge courts to take a more 
relaxed approach to state action due to the unique nature of the 
discrimination at issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you live in Indiana, your state government uses your tax dollars to 
discriminate against vulnerable LGBT1 youth through its school voucher 
program.2  Indiana has the largest statewide school voucher program in the 
 
 1. In recent years, discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity have begun to 
employ more inclusive acronyms, such as LGBTQ. See Michael Gold, The ABCs of 
L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/ 
lgbtq-gender-language.html [https://perma.cc/QP2X-6N72].  For ease of reading, this Note 
uses the most commonly recognized acronym, LGBT, as an umbrella term to encompass the 
full spectrum of sexual and gender minorities affected by voucher discrimination. 
 2. School vouchers are state-funded educational scholarships that make public funding 
available for students to attend private schools. See infra Part I.A (discussing the history and 
mechanics of school voucher programs). 
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country.3  Many of the private schools that participate in the voucher program 
have discriminatory admissions policies.  For example, the student handbook 
for Blackhawk Christian School in Fort Wayne, Indiana, states that the school 
reserves the right to reject or discontinue the enrollment of any student 
“living in, condoning, or supporting sexual immorality; practicing 
homosexual lifestyle or alternative gender identity, promoting such practices, 
or otherwise having the inability to support the moral principles of the 
school.”4  This policy allows the school to reject or expel any LGBT student 
simply because of his or her sexual orientation. 
The enrollment policy from Lighthouse Christian Academy in 
Bloomington, Indiana, is perhaps even more alarming.  In its enrollment 
brochure, the school reserves the right to reject or discontinue the enrollment 
of any students whose home includes “homosexual or bisexual activity” or 
“practicing alternate gender identity or any other identity or behavior that 
violates God’s ordained distinctions between the two sexes, male and 
female.”5  Thus, students are not only vulnerable to discrimination as a result 
of their own sexual orientation or gender identity—students can be, and have 
been, excluded from private schools due to their parent’s sexual orientation 
and gender identity.6  These admissions policies are not isolated cases of 
discrimination.  According to one study, approximately 10 percent of 
voucher schools in Indiana—totaling at least twenty-seven schools—have 
admissions policies “suggesting or declaring that LGBT students are not 
welcome.”7  School voucher discrimination is not limited to Indiana; scores 
 
 3. Cory Turner & Anya Kamenetz, School Vouchers Get 2 New Report Cards, NPR 
(June 26, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/06/26/533192616/school-
vouchers-get-a-new-report-card [https://perma.cc/SX98-UP79]; Stephanie Wang, Indiana 
Still Has the Nation’s Largest Voucher Program.  But Growth Is Slowing Down., CHALKBEAT 
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://in.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2018/03/01/indiana-still-has-the-nations-
largest-voucher-program-but-growth-is-slowing-down/ [https://perma.cc/TQ75-XK7L].  In 
the fall of 2016, more than 34,000 Indiana students used vouchers to attend private schools. 
Julia Donheiser, Choice for Most:  In Nation’s Largest Voucher Program, $16 Million Went 
to Schools with Anti-LGBT Policies, CHALKBEAT (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.chalkbeat.org/ 
posts/us/2017/08/10/choice-for-most-in-nations-largest-voucher-program-16-million-went-
to-schools-with-anti-lgbt-policies/ [https://perma.cc/26N5-Q3LY]. 
 4. BLACKHAWK CHRISTIAN SCH., PARENT-STUDENT HANDBOOK 2018–2019, at 23 (2018), 
http://www.blackhawkchristian.org/downloads/Parent-Student-Handbook-
SECONDARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7LF-VWG5]. 
 5. Brittani Howell, Lighthouse Christian Academy Responds to Concerns over Its 
Admissions Policy, HERALD TIMES (May 26, 2017), http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/news/ 
local/lighthouse-christian-academy-responds-to-concerns-over-its-admissions-policy/article_ 
92d88110-415b-11e7-bfc0-87e27ca51d68.html [https://perma.cc/89SJ-HC4D]. 
 6. This Note focuses on discrimination against children because of their own sexual 
orientation rather than the sexual orientation of their parents.  For a discussion of claims 
specifically stemming from discrimination against a student because of his or her parents’ 
sexual orientation, see generally Daniel Makofsky, The New “Illegitimate Child”:  How 
Parochial Schools Are Imputing Discrimination Against Homosexuals to Children of 
Homosexual Parents and Getting Away with It, 26 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 965 (2013). 
 7. Donheiser, supra note 3. 
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of schools across the country that participate in state-run voucher programs 
treat LGBT students as second-class citizens.8 
LGBT youth already face high levels of discrimination in schools even 
without overtly biased school admissions policies.  The data regarding 
general LGBT discrimination and its effect on mental health is harrowing.  
According to a recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, nearly one-third of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth had 
attempted suicide at least once in the last year, compared to 6 percent of 
heterosexual youth.9  According to a 2012 Human Rights Campaign report, 
nearly 20 percent of LGBT youth have experienced physical violence at 
school.10  More than 50 percent of LGBT youth report being verbally 
harassed and called names at school—more than twice the rate at which non-
LGBT students experience such harassment.11  These and other struggles 
faced by LGBT youth threaten their academic and career success.12  When 
states allow voucher-accepting private schools to maintain discriminatory 
policies and practices, the states are actively contributing to hostile 
environments that are serious threats to the health and well-being of LGBT 
youth. 
The issue of discrimination in voucher-accepting private schools has 
recently gained national attention due to the Trump administration’s 
commitment to expanding federal support for school-choice programs,13 
which include voucher programs.14  As originally proposed, President 
Trump’s 2018 budget redirected nearly $1.5 billion to expand school-choice 
operations,15 while eliminating or downsizing more than twenty other 
 
 8. See infra Part I.B (highlighting instances of voucher-accepting private schools with 
discriminatory admissions policies). 
 9. Laura Kann et al., Sexual Identity, Sex of Sexual Contacts, and Health-Related 
Behaviors Among Students in Grades 9–12—United States and Selected Sites 2015, 65 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REPORT, Aug. 12, 2016, at 1, 20, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/volumes/65/ss/ss6509a1.htm [https://perma.cc/M2JX-HCEW].  Note that transgender 
youth were not included in this statistic. 
 10. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, GROWING UP LGBT IN AMERICA:  HRC YOUTH SURVEY 
REPORT KEY FINDINGS 16 (2012), https://assets.hrc.org//files/assets/resources/Growing-Up-
LGBT-in-America_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACP-44F6]. 
 11. Id. at 7, 11. 
 12. See LGBT Youth, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
T28D-DFUJ] (last updated June 21, 2017). 
 13. “School choice” refers to the practice of providing educational options beyond 
traditional public schooling. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. During his presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump said he would allocate $20 
billion to create a federal block grant that would vastly expand the reach of the federal school-
choice program. See Sean Sullivan & Emma Brown, Trump Pitches $20 Billion Education 
Plan at Ohio Charter School That Received Poor Marks from State, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/08/trump-pitches-
20-billion-education-plan-at-ohio-charter-school-that-received-poor-marks-from-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RRR-J3MU]. 
 15. Emma Brown, Valerie Strauss & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump’s First Full 
Education Budget:  Deep Cuts to Public School Programs in Pursuit of School Choice, WASH. 
POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumps-first-full-
education-budget-deep-cuts-to-public-school-programs-in-pursuit-of-school-choice/2017/ 
05/17/2a25a2cc-3a41-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/2RSJ-WL5E]. 
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student-centered educational programs, including funding for the Special 
Olympics.16  Although Congress rejected this part of the proposal,17 Trump 
was undeterred.  His 2019 budget proposal once again allocated over 
$1 billion for school-choice expansion.18 
The Trump administration’s selection of Betsy DeVos as Secretary of 
Education further illuminated its affection for school-choice expansion, as 
she is one of the nation’s foremost proponents of school choice.19  Secretary 
DeVos inadvertently focused the school-choice discussion on discrimination 
when she indicated that private schools receiving taxpayer dollars in the form 
of vouchers may discriminate against LGBT students without reproach from 
the Department of Education.  During a May 2017 hearing before a 
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee regarding President 
Trump’s proposed budget, Secretary DeVos testified regarding how she 
planned to implement her school-choice agenda.20  The subcommittee 
specifically asked Secretary DeVos how she would handle a voucher-
accepting private school that discriminates against LGBT students and 
presented her with an example:  the Lighthouse Christian Academy in 
 
 16. Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Refuses to Rule Out Giving Funds to Schools That 
Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/us/ 
politics/betsy-devos-refuses-to-rule-out-giving-funds-to-schools-that-discriminate.html 
[https://perma.cc/QP63-2RQ7]. 
 17. On September 7, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved an 
appropriations bill that did not include allocations for the proposed school-choice expansion, 
effectively shutting down the proposal for the 2018 fiscal year. See Mercedes Schneider, 
Senate Appropriations Has No Funding for Betsy DeVos’ Private School Voucher Hopes, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senate-
appropriations-has-no-funding-for-betsy-devos_us_59b5ebd4e4b0c50640cd68c8 
[https://perma.cc/C6NP-FM92]. 
 18. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, ACCOUNTABLE:  AN AMERICAN 
BUDGET 40 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budget-
fy2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4XG-GYPH]; J. Brian Charles, Trump Proposes 
Unprecedented Expansion of School Choice, GOVERNING (Feb. 12, 2018), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-trump-doe-education-budget-schools-
states.html [https://perma.cc/8VSU-7R29].  Congress again rejected these school-choice 
proposals. See Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Congress Rejects Much of Betsy 
DeVos’s Agenda in Spending Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2018/03/21/congress-rejects-much-of-
betsy-devoss-agenda-in-spending-bill/ [https://perma.cc/A2BF-E7TB].  Nonetheless, Trump 
and Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos have shown no signs of conceding on the issue, so 
it is still a viable consideration. See Emily Richmond, Does Trump’s Education Budget Even 
Matter?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/02/ 
does-trumps-education-budget-even-matter/553271/ [https://perma.cc/FV9H-SGSW] (noting 
that, despite the lack of congressional support, Trump and DeVos “remain committed” to their 
school-choice agenda). 
 19. See Background on Betsy DeVos from the ACLU of Michigan, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/other/background-betsy-devos-aclu-michigan [https://perma.cc/84K3-
7ZEV] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 20. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & 
Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 288–91 (2017) [hereinafter 
Hearing]; see also Green, supra note 16. 
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Indiana.21  When pressed, Secretary DeVos refused to indicate that schools 
with discriminatory admissions policies would be denied public funding.22 
School-choice programs are the subject of much contentious debate,23 and 
there is conflicting evidence regarding their efficacy.24  However, this Note 
takes no position on the value or desirability of such programs.  Instead, this 
Note investigates the potential protections for LGBT students who suffer 
discrimination at the hands of voucher-accepting private schools.  Even if 
federal support for voucher programs does not expand,25 LGBT students are 
still vulnerable to discrimination under existing state voucher programs.26  
This Note’s proposed equal protection resolution to discrimination would 
apply to existing state voucher programs, irrespective of federal expansion.27  
The other proposed solution, the Title IX approach, would only apply to 
schools receiving federal funding.28  Because existing potential protections 
are flimsy at best, action is needed to ensure equal treatment of LGBT 
students.29 
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information, including a 
brief history of voucher programs and jurisprudence underpinning the 
legality of vouchers generally.  Part II outlines the current potential remedies 
available to discrimination victims by describing the potential remedies 
available at the state level, a potential federal constitutional claim, and 
potential federal statutory protection—all of which are insufficient 
protection.  Part III contemplates how to best provide protections for LGBT 
students.  First, Part III briefly explains that providing antidiscrimination 
protections for LGBT students is a necessary and logical extension of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in education discrimination and then 
contemplates two potential routes to protecting LGBT students.  Part III 
ultimately concludes that the best way to protect LGBT students is for a 
 
 21. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 309; supra text accompanying notes 5–6; see also Peter 
Balonon-Rosen, DeVos Grilled over LGBTQ Discrimination at Bloomington Voucher School, 
IND. PUB. MEDIA (May 26, 2017), https://indianapublicmedia.org/stateimpact/2017/05/26/ 
devos-grilled-discrimination-bloomington-voucher-school/ [https://perma.cc/9FGB-GSN7]. 
 22. Hearing, supra note 20, at 309–10. 
 23. See infra Part I.A (briefly explaining the debate). 
 24. See School Choice:  What the Research Says, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC., 
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/research/school-choice-what-research-says 
[https://perma.cc/87HH-SAXA] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“In general, we find that school 
choices work for some students sometimes, are worse for some students sometimes . . . .”); 
see also GREG FORSTER, A WIN-WIN SOLUTION:  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL 
CHOICE 1 (4th ed. 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-5-
Win-Win-Solution-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C3W-XBML] (finding that some empirical 
studies show that school-choice programs improve student outcomes, such as test scores, 
whereas other studies show a negative impact on student outcomes). 
 25. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part II.A (discussing the insufficiency of existing state-level protections). 
 27. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the proposed equal protection claim that a student-
plaintiff could bring). 
 28. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the Title IX solution). 
 29. See infra Part III.B (discussing potential solutions to protect LGBT students). 
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student-plaintiff30 to bring a federal equal protection claim and to argue for 
a relaxed approach to state action. 
I.  HOW SCHOOL VOUCHERS HAVE BECOME VEHICLES FOR 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT STUDENTS 
This Part provides background on the development of school voucher 
programs as well as concerns about how voucher programs are used to 
discriminate against LGBT students.  Part I.A discusses the history of school 
choice generally and explains the difference between voucher programs and 
other school-choice mechanisms.  Part I.A also describes the seminal 
Supreme Court voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,31 which solidified 
the place of vouchers in the school-choice landscape.  Part I.B details 
discrimination concerns associated with voucher programs and describes 
troubling instances of LGBT discrimination in private schools that accept 
publicly funded vouchers. 
A.  School Choice Generally and the History of Voucher Programs 
“School choice” refers to the practice of providing educational options 
beyond traditional public schooling.32  Although options such as 
homeschooling or online public schools are sometimes included in 
conversations about school choice,33 the more commonly debated options, 
such as vouchers, entail providing public money to fund attendance at private 
schools.34 
The earliest incarnations of state programs that fund private school 
education developed nearly 140 years ago in Maine and Vermont.35  Those 
programs—still in operation today—provided public money for rural 
students living in areas without local public schools to attend private 
schools.36  The modern notion of school choice traces its roots to economist 
Milton Friedman’s 1955 paper, “The Role of Government in Education.”37  
Friedman’s paper popularized the theory that using public dollars to fund 
 
 30. This term is used throughout this Note and encompasses anyone involved in a suit 
based on discrimination against an LGBT student at the hands of a private school—for 
example, the parents may sue on behalf of the child. 
 31. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 32. See School Choice:  What the Research Says, supra note 24. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See, e.g., Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:  
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 703, 705–06 (2015) (highlighting that vouchers are a “controversial” school-choice 
mechanism). 
 35. School Vouchers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
education/school-choice-vouchers.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9L7-WG92] (last visited Nov. 15, 
2018). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). 
1258 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
students’ attendance at private schools would increase student achievement 
and competition among schools and would decrease education costs.38 
It was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that school-choice programs were 
“seriously debated as educational policy initiatives.”39  In 1989, the first 
modern voucher program began in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.40  The 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program began operating in 1990 with the goal 
of “provid[ing] educational freedom and choice to low-income parents in 
Milwaukee who did not have the financial means to send their children to 
private schools.”41  Thereafter, the first statewide school voucher program 
targeting low-income families was born in Indiana in 2011.42 
School-choice programs typically come in three forms:  tax credit 
scholarship programs, education savings accounts, and vouchers.43  In tuition 
tax credit scholarship programs, sometimes called “neo-voucher” programs, 
individuals or corporations donate to a state fund that then distributes 
scholarships for eligible students to attend private schools.44  In return, 
donors receive a tax credit.45  Education savings accounts are a mechanism 
for parents to divert into a savings account all or part of the money the state 
would normally use to fund their child’s public education.46  Parents may use 
those funds to pay for “various approved educational expenses, including 
private school tuition.”47 
In a voucher program, the state offers parents vouchers that they can apply 
to private school tuition for their children.48  The vouchers are funded by the 
tax dollars that would otherwise pay for those students’ public education.49  
Voucher programs have been the subject of contentious debate for many 
years.50  The debate has created some unlikely bedfellows.  For example, 
liberals decrying the effects of failing public schools on minority youth and 
conservatives seeking public funding for religious education have banded 
 
 38. See School Vouchers, supra note 35. 
 39. Suzanne E. Eckes, Julie Mead & Jessica Ulm, Dollars to Discriminate:  The 
(Un)intended Consequences of School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537, 539 (2016). 
 40. School Vouchers, supra note 35. 
 41. The History of School Choice in Wisconsin, SCH. CHOICE WIS., 
https://www.chooseyourschoolwi.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/W6NZ-N2C9] (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018).  Wisconsin expanded to a statewide model in 2013. Id. 
 42. School Vouchers, supra note 35. 
 43. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 34, at 705–06.  Mead’s article comprehensively explains 
which types of school-choice programs operate in each state. Id.  Charter schools and magnet 
schools are sometimes included in school-choice discussions, but are outside the scope of this 
Note as they are both considered public schools. School Choice and Charters, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-and-charters.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QNV8-L4WC] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (noting that both charter schools 
and magnet schools are public schools). 
 44. Mead, supra note 34, at 705–06. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 706. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to 
Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 745 (2003). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally Mead, supra note 34. 
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together to support voucher programs.51  Proponents of voucher programs 
highlight three benefits:  (1) increasing educational opportunities for low-
income students by allowing them to escape their poorly performing public 
schools;52 (2) incentivizing failing schools to do better;53 and (3) recognizing 
the inherent value of allowing parents to choose a school based on what they 
feel is best for their children.54  Opponents claim that voucher programs 
facilitate racial segregation,55 threaten the public school system by diverting 
already-scarce funds56 and create problematic church-state entanglement by 
forcing or encouraging taxpayers to fund religious schools.57  Critics also 
point to research suggesting that private schools do not provide better 
educational outcomes than their public counterparts.58 
Prior to 2002, one of the biggest debates regarding school vouchers was 
whether permitting public funds to support students’ attendance at private, 
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.59  The first major case 
to address this issue was Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist.60  In Nyquist, the Supreme Court considered three New 
York state programs that provided financial aid to private schools.61  The first 
was a direct grant program that provided money to private schools to be used 
for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment.62  The second was a 
tuition-reimbursement plan for low-income parents whose children attended 
a qualifying private school.63  The third was a tax deduction for parents who 
 
 51. See Kavey, supra note 48, at 745. 
 52. See generally Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax 
Benefits in Federal and State Judicial Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335 (2016). 
 53. See School Vouchers, supra note 35. 
 54. See Brad J. Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the 
Establishment Clause:  Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-Choice Legislation, 33 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 449 (2002). 
 55. Steven L. Nelson, Still Serving Two Masters?  Evaluating the Conflict Between School 
Choice and Desegregation Under the Lens of Critical Race Theory, 26 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 
44 (2017).  Nelson also notes that school-choice policies frequently result in predominantly 
white, unelected boards running schools in minority communities, often without minority-
stakeholder representation on the board. Id. at 47. 
 56. See Oluwole & Green, supra note 52, at 1347. 
 57. See id. at 1347–48. 
 58. Addressing the question of the effectiveness of voucher programs is outside of the 
scope of this Note.  For a discussion of voucher effectiveness, see, for example, David Trilling, 
School Vouchers and Student Achievement:  Reviewing the Research, JOURNALIST’S 
RESOURCE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/education/school-
vouchers-choice-student-achievement [https://perma.cc/RE9T-TPQ5], and School Choice:  
What the Research Says, supra note 24. 
 59. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend I.  
To evaluate whether the Clause has been violated, courts employ the so-called “Lemon test,” 
which asks:  (1) whether the government’s action has a secular or a religious purpose; (2) 
whether the primary effect of the government’s action is to advance or endorse religion; and 
(3) whether the government’s policy or practice fosters an excessive entanglement between 
government and religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 61. Id. at 761–62. 
 62. Id. at 762–63. 
 63. Id. at 764–65. 
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did not qualify for the tuition-reimbursement plan.64  The participating 
schools were largely religious schools, primarily members of the Roman 
Catholic Church.65  The Court determined that the programs all had the 
impermissible effect of advancing religion and were therefore 
unconstitutional.66  The decision seemed to inhibit the growth of school-
choice programs for many years.67  However, the holding was limited to the 
specific set of facts in the case68:  namely, the provision of benefits 
exclusively to private schools and parents of those schools;69 a program 
structure “designed explicitly to . . . ‘incentiv[ize] . . . parents to send their 
children to sectarian schools’”;70 and the programmatic purpose of propping 
up private religious schools facing “increasingly grave fiscal problems.”71  
The Court explicitly left open the question of whether “some form of public 
assistance (e.g., [vouchers]) made available generally without regard to the 
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution 
benefited” may be permissible.72 
That question was settled in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, in which the Court 
held that state voucher programs that include religious schools do not 
necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.73  In Zelman, the Court 
addressed Cleveland’s voucher program.74  The program included two types 
of financial assistance to parents whose children were in a qualifying school 
district:  (1) a tuition grant for parents to send their children to a participating 
public or private school of the parent’s choosing, and (2) tutorial aid for 
students who remained in public school.75  Eighty-two percent of the 
participating private schools had a religious affiliation, and 96 percent of 
participating students elected to enroll in religiously affiliated schools.76  
Despite clear evidence that most of the state funding was going toward 
supporting religious schools, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
program and emphasized the importance of parental choice as a cleansing 
mechanism; the indirect nature of the aid, which passed first to parents and 
 
 64. Id. at 765–66. 
 65. Id. at 768. 
 66. Id. at 798. 
 67. See Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 540 (“Voucher programs involving private religious 
schools were long considered unconstitutional after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.”). 
 68. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. 
 69. Id. at 783. 
 70. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002) (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 
786). 
 71. Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795). 
 72. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. 
 73. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662–63. 
 74. Id. at 643.  Schools in the Cleveland City School District were performing so 
abysmally that “[i]n 1995, a Federal District Court declared a ‘crisis of magnitude’ and placed 
the entire Cleveland school district under state control. . . .  Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could 
pass a basic proficiency examination . . . .  More than two-thirds of high school students either 
dropped or failed out before graduation.” Id. at 644. 
 75. Id. at 645. 
 76. Id. at 647. 
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then to schools, was key to the Court’s decision.77  The Court held that 
“where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance . . . to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct 
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine 
and independent private choice,” the program does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.78  This decision solidified the position of voucher 
programs as a viable component of the education landscape.79 
B.  Discrimination Concerns Associated with Vouchers 
Although Zelman settled the Establishment Clause question, controversy 
persists about voucher programs.  One of the primary concerns is that 
vouchers provide opportunities for state-sponsored discrimination.80  This 
concern is justified by the historical relationship between vouchers and 
discrimination81:  “In fact, so-called ‘choice academies,’ private schools that 
began in resistance to desegregation existed in several southern states, 
including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia.”82  
Notably, three of those five states currently have voucher programs.83 
Because private schools have broad discretion to operate as they wish, 
many fear that the schools have the ability to discriminate against disfavored 
groups, such as LGBT students or racial and religious minorities.84  Many 
organizations have criticized voucher programs as offering the opportunity 
for government subsidization of such discrimination.85  A wide array of well-
respected civil rights and educational groups have expressed these concerns 
about vouchers, including the National Education Association, the National 
Parent Teacher Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Alliance of Black School Educators, and the Leadership Conference 
on Civil Rights.86 
The concern about state-sponsored discrimination is not just theoretical.  
In addition to the discrimination occurring in Indiana,87 private schools 
 
 77. Id. at 662–63; see Abner S. Greene, The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause 
Doctrine, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 232–34 (2006) (discussing the importance of the 
indirect nature of the aid and how this opinion comports with prior Establishment Clause 
cases). 
 78. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652. 
 79. Even though Zelman settled the Establishment Clause question, voucher litigation 
continued at the state level. See generally Mead, supra note 34 (providing an in-depth analysis 
of state voucher litigation). 
 80. See generally Eckes et al., supra note 39. 
 81. Id. at 538 (“Vouchers have a long history in relation to discrimination, particularly 
racial segregation and resistance to adhere to the Supreme Court’s order to desegregate schools 
in Brown v. Board of Education.”); see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) 
(noting that in Mississippi, “the creation and enlargement of [private schools] occurred 
simultaneously with major events in the desegregation of public schools”). 
 82. Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 538–39. 
 83. See infra Part II.A. 
 84. Kavey, supra note 48, at 745–46; see also Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 539. 
 85. Kavey, supra note 48, at 745–46. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
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across the country are discriminating against LGBT people.  For example, in 
2010 a private elementary school in Greater Boston withdrew an eight-year-
old student’s admission upon learning that his parents were lesbians.88  Also 
in 2010, a Colorado preschooler was denied kindergarten enrollment when 
the private school learned of his mothers’ sexual orientation.89  Stories like 
these are disturbingly common.90  Yet even more disturbing than the 
discrimination itself is that this discrimination occurs at schools that receive 
government funding.  At least 115 voucher-accepting schools in Georgia 
have “severe antigay policies.”91  At least four voucher-accepting schools in 
North Carolina admit to having anti-LGBT policies.92  Realistically, the 
number of schools with anti-LGBT policies is likely even higher than 
existing estimates—reported statistics “are likely an understatement” 
because many schools do not publicize their admissions policies.93 
In fact, there is even institutional guidance that encourages Christian 
schools to adopt discriminatory policies.  More than half of the schools in 
Indiana with discriminatory policies are accredited by the Association of 
Christian Schools International (ACSI).94  ACSI encourages discrimination 
by providing its member schools with a handbook entitled Steps Your School 
Can Take When Dealing with Homosexual Issues, which encourages schools 
to adopt discriminatory policies by providing a model policy for schools to 
use: 
________ Christian School’s biblical role is to work in conjunction with 
the home to mold students to be Christlike.  Of necessity, this involves the 
school’s understanding and belief of what qualities or characteristics 
exemplify a Christlike life.  The school reserves the right, within its sole 
discretion, to refuse admission of an applicant or to discontinue enrollment 
of a student if the atmosphere or conduct within a particular home or the 
activities of the student are counter to or are in opposition to the biblical 
lifestyle the school teaches.  This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, 
participating in, supporting, or condoning sexual immorality, homosexual 
activity, or bisexual activity; promoting such practices; or being unable to 
 
 88. Jay Lindsay, Mass. Catholic School Won’t Admit Lesbians’ Son, BOSTON.COM (May 
12, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/05/12/mass_ 
catholic_school_wont_admit_lesbians_son_1273691291/ [https://perma.cc/6EYE-CGNK]. 
 89. Rosemary Black, Catholic School in Denver Denies Admission to Kindergartener 
Because of Lesbian Parents, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/catholic-school-denver-denies-admission-kindergartener-lesbian-parents-
article-1.174272# [https://perma.cc/57PW-WTDS]. 
 90. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, These Schools Get Millions of Tax Dollars to Discriminate 
Against LGBTQ Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/discrimination-lgbt-private-religious-schools_us_ 
5a32a45de4b00dbbcb5ba0be [https://perma.cc/5KKF-F6J3]. 
 91. Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring 
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgia-
backed-scholarships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/YB6V-25P5]. 
 92. Rachel Stone & Jane Little, Some Schools Get State Money, Deny Gay Enrollment, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/ 
article95390197.html [https://perma.cc/9JNZ-72RG]. 
 93. Donheiser, supra note 3. 
 94. Id. 
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support the moral principles of the school. (See Leviticus 20:13 and 
Romans 1:27.)95 
Over 3000 schools in the United States are members of this pro-school-
choice group.96 
One might argue that given the difficulties LGBT students experience in 
the school setting,97 they would want to find the most accepting 
environments possible.  In other words, some might say that because there 
are plenty of schools without anti-LGBT policies, those students will 
logically seek out and find acceptance at those schools, so there is no reason 
for discriminatory schools to be forced to change.  This conclusion fails for 
two reasons:  First, although LGBT students very well may not want to attend 
schools with hateful admissions policies, the mere fact that they are 
prohibited from attending is itself injurious.  It signals to the students that 
they are unequal and unworthy in the eyes of local institutions and 
community members.  Second, schools with anti-LGBT policies pose an 
especially dangerous threat to currently enrolled students who are not out.98  
Students are confronted with an impossible choice:  continue to bear the 
enormous burden of keeping secret an integral part of their identity99 or be 
rejected by their community—forced to interrupt their education, leave their 
friends, and be treated as a pariah. 
II.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO REMEDY LGBT DISCRIMINATION 
ARE INSUFFICIENT 
Students and their families who experience discrimination at the hands of 
private schools may turn to the courts for a remedy in the hope that such 
unfair treatment is legally prohibited.  However, they will be disappointed to 
find that few protections exist for LGBT students in either state or federal 
law.  Because LGBT students have little legal recourse when they are 
discriminated against, they continue to occupy second-class-citizen status in 
the United States. 
This Part addresses various legal avenues through which a student-plaintiff 
might hope to find protection from discrimination.  First, this Part considers 
potential state-level protections in the form of voucher statute provisions, 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. FAQs, ASS’N CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS INT’L, https://www.acsi.org/membership/acsi-
overview/faqs [https://perma.cc/R5AP-AGAH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 97. See supra Introduction; infra Part III.A.1. 
 98. A student who is not “out” has not publicly disclosed his or her minority sexual 
orientation or gender identity.  For an explanation of some terms relating to sexual orientation 
and gender identity, see Glossary of Terms, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/ 
resources/glossary-of-terms [https://perma.cc/M3RL-EPQB] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 99. Existing in unsupportive school environments can seriously increase mental health 
risks, such as suicidal ideation, for LGBT students. See generally, e.g., Mark L. 
Hatzenbuehler, Michelle Birkett, Aimee Van Wagenen & Ilan H. Meyer, Protective School 
Climates and Reduced Risk for Suicide Ideation in Sexual Minority Youths, 104 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 279 (2014). 
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state antidiscrimination laws, and state constitutions.100  Then, this Part 
considers potential constitutional protections in the form of an equal 
protection claim that is predicated upon a finding of “state action.”  Finally, 
this Part considers potential federal statutory protections.  This Part 
ultimately demonstrates that none of these options provide sufficient 
protection for LGBT students. 
A.  State-Level Protections Are Insufficient 
Currently, sixteen states have some form of publicly funded voucher 
program.101  In these states, student-plaintiffs could look to three state-level 
sources for potential discrimination remedies:  the voucher statute, state 
antidiscrimination statutes, and the state constitution. 
A student-plaintiff searching for protection in a voucher statute will almost 
uniformly be disappointed.  Though some programs include 
nondiscrimination provisions in their enabling statutes,102 these provisions 
are far from comprehensive or sufficient.  Only a single state, Maryland, 
prohibits participating schools from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation.103  Although the federal program in Washington, D.C. includes 
a prohibition on sex discrimination, no state program does.104  Three 
programs do not impose any explicit nondiscrimination requirement:  
Maine,105 Nevada,106 and Vermont.107  In fact, some voucher programs seem 
to contemplate future imposition of antidiscrimination norms and attempt to 
preempt it.108  For example, Arizona’s legislature promised that a private 
school “shall not be required to alter its creed, practices, admissions policy 
or curriculum” in order to participate in the voucher program.109 
 
 100. Even when considering an expanded federal voucher program, the current landscape 
of state voucher programs is instructive, especially since the structure of a potential future 
federal expansion is unknown. 
 101. These states are Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, Eckes 
et al., supra note 39, at 544, as well as Maryland, Boost Scholarship Program:  Application 
Information, U. MD., http://www.educationmaryland.org/BOOST [https://perma.cc/ZTD6-
KHXS] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 102. For a comprehensive list of the specifics of each program, see Eckes et al., supra note 
39, at 547.  With the exception of Maine, Nevada, and Vermont, programs generally prohibit 
discrimination based on race, color, and national origin. Id. 
 103. 2018 Md. Laws 2804–05. 
 104. Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 547.  Note that this may be largely due to a desire to 
protect the validity of single-sex schools; however, this goal can be achieved while also 
providing for protection from discrimination. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 105. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (2018). 
 106. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388D.250–.280 (2018). 
 107. See VT. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 821–822 (2018). 
 108. See Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 550.  Although it is worth noting that such provisions 
could potentially be preempted by federal legislation or judicial rulings, the important 
takeaway is what these provisions reveal about the intent of the states’ decision makers:  a 
desire to insulate schools with discriminatory policies from attempts to force open their 
doors—with the exception of racial discrimination, which the legislators knew they could not 
get away with. 
 109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-2404 (2018). 
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Nor is a student-plaintiff likely to find solace in state antidiscrimination 
laws.  Private acts of discrimination can be prohibited through public 
accommodations laws.  Typically, private landowners have the right to 
exclude whoever they want from their land.110  However, most states have 
laws that designate certain private properties “places of public 
accommodation,” thereby limiting the property owner’s or business owner’s 
right to exclude in order to prevent discriminatory practices.111  In order for 
a student-plaintiff to bring a claim under a public accommodation law, the 
law must (1) include sexual orientation in its list of protected classes, and 
(2) include schools in its definition of places of public accommodation.  
Three voucher states fail both prongs because they have no public 
accommodation law at all:  Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina.112  
Most states with voucher programs fail the first prong.  Arizona,113 
Florida,114 Indiana,115 Louisiana,116 Ohio,117 Oklahoma,118 Tennessee,119 
and Utah120 do not include sexual orientation as a protected class in their 
public accommodation statutes.  Maryland121 and Wisconsin122 fail the 
second prong because their statutes do not include schools or educational 
facilities in their definitions of places of public accommodation.  While 
Vermont does protect sexual orientation,123 it is unclear whether private 
schools are covered.124  Of the sixteen voucher states, only two provide 
 
 110. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
730 (1998). 
 111. Forty-five states have public accommodation laws intended for nondisabled 
individuals.  All states with such a law prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, ancestry, 
and religion. State Public Accommodation Law, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-
laws.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/4C4H-MYCE]. 
 112. Id. 
 113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1442 (2018). 
 114. FLA. STAT. §§ 413.08, 760.08 (2018). 
 115. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2018). 
 116. LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247 (2018). 
 117. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02 (2018). 
 118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1402 (2018). 
 119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (2018). 
 120. UTAH CODE § 13-7-3 (2018). 
 121. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-301 to -304 (2018). 
 122. WIS. STAT. § 106.52(1)(e)(1) (2018).  Although the Wisconsin statute does not 
explicitly include schools in its enumerated list of places of public accommodation, there may 
be an argument that schools should be included due to the open-ended language of the statute:  
“‘Public place of accommodation or amusement’ shall be interpreted broadly to include, but 
not be limited to [enumerated list] and any place where accommodations, amusement, goods, 
or services are available . . . .” Id.  Schools arguably provide a “service” in the form of 
education. 
 123. VT. STAT. tit. 9, § 4502 (2018). 
 124. Id. § 4501 (“‘Place of public accommodation’ means any school, restaurant, store, 
establishment, or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages, 
benefits, or accommodations are offered to the general public.”).  Although schools are 
included on the list, the phrase “offered to the general public” throws a wrench in the works.  
On the one hand, private schools are arguably not offered to the general public in that they 
typically have a selective admissions process—somewhat analogous to a private membership 
club, which is typically exempted from public accommodation laws.  On the other hand, 
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unambiguous protection for LGBT students.  Maine’s statute125 and 
Nevada’s statute126 include sexual orientation as a protected class and 
include schools as a place of public accommodation.  Unless an LGBT 
student is lucky enough to be discriminated against in Maine or Nevada, he 
or she will not find protection in state antidiscrimination law. 
Finally, a student-plaintiff will find no assistance in state constitutions.  No 
state constitution explicitly provides for protection of LGBT individuals who 
are the subjects of educational discrimination.127  Fewer than half of all state 
constitutions even contain a provision prohibiting sex discrimination.128  Of 
the voucher states, only four have constitutional protections for sex:  
Florida,129 Louisiana,130 Maryland,131 and Utah.132  Even if a state 
constitutional provision did provide protection for LGBT people, a student-
plaintiff would have to clear the difficult hurdle of demonstrating that the 
school’s action constituted state action.133 
In sum, a student-plaintiff will find no relief in a state constitution in any 
state, public accommodation statutory protection in only two states, and 
voucher program statutory protection in only one state.  State-level 
protections are insufficient to ensure that LGBT students are provided equal 
access to educational opportunities and protected from invidious 
discrimination. 
 
accepting vouchers arguably opens the schoolhouse gate to the subset of the general public 
that qualifies for the vouchers. 
 125. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4552–4553, 4591 (2018). 
 126. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 651.050, 651.070 (2018). 
 127. See ALA. CONST.; ALASKA CONST.; ARIZ. CONST.; ARK. CONST.; CAL. CONST.; COLO. 
CONST.; CONN. CONST.; DEL. CONST.; FLA. CONST.; GA. CONST.; HAW. CONST.; IDAHO CONST.; 
ILL. CONST.; IND. CONST.; IOWA CONST.; KAN. CONST.; KY. CONST.; LA. CONST.; ME. CONST.; 
MD. CONST.; MASS. CONST.; MICH. CONST.; MINN. CONST.; MISS. CONST.; MO. CONST.; MONT. 
CONST.; NEB. CONST.; NEV. CONST.; N.H. CONST.; N.J. CONST.; N.M. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.; 
N.C. CONST.; N.D. CONST.; OHIO CONST.; OKLA. CONST.; OR. CONST.; PA. CONST.; R.I. 
CONST.; S.C. CONST.; S.D. CONST.; TENN. CONST.; TEX. CONST.; UTAH CONST.; VT. CONST.; 
VA. CONST.; WASH. CONST.; W. VA. CONST.; WIS. CONST.; WYO. CONST.  Note that a limited 
number of state constitutions may provide some level of protection via judicial interpretation 
of their equal protection clauses. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 
(Conn. 2008) (finding that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis under the state constitution).  One state constitution does textually provide 
for sexual orientation protection, but only in the voting context. See ILL. CONST. art. III, § 8 
(“No person shall be denied the right to register to vote or to cast a ballot in an election based 
on . . . sexual orientation . . . .”). 
 128. See LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENTS:  STATE PROVISIONS 1 (2004), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/ 
20040823_RS20217_ca058473694533d5becfe0493fcf17b79fe637bf.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5LRN-CLVW]. 
 129. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 130. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 131. MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46. 
 132. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 133. See infra Part II.B (discussing state action). 
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B.  Constitutional Protections Are Insufficient 
To bring a federal constitutional claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate:  
(1) the violation of a constitutional right (here, Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection), and (2) that the right was violated by a state actor.134  An LGBT 
student-plaintiff faces significant challenges under both prongs. 
1.  The Equal Protection Prong 
The Constitution as originally ratified did not provide for equal protection 
under the law.135  After more than a century of discrimination and 
subjugation of racial minorities,136 the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 
the wake of the Civil War.137  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”138  The Equal Protection Clause 
has become a vital tool for combating state discrimination,139 but it was 
largely unused prior to the 1950s.140  The Supreme Court’s hesitation to find 
that a state or local action violated the Equal Protection Clause may have 
stemmed from the notion that virtually every law classifies people or treats 
some people differently in some way.141  Equal protection as an 
antidiscrimination tool gained prominence142 with Brown v. Board of 
Education,143 where the Court struck down the “separate but equal” 
justification for educational segregation.  Although the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only guarantees equal protection by the states,144 the Court 
incorporated this protection against the federal government in Bolling v. 
Sharpe.145 
Courts address three central questions when evaluating an equal protection 
claim146:  (1) What is the classification created by the government’s 
action?147  (2) What is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, given the 
 
 134. See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 135. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 684 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 139. See, e.g., LENORA M. LAPIDUS, EMILY J. MARTIN & NAMITHA LUTHRA, THE RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN:  THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS 2 (4th ed. 2009) (“[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause has been invoked often to invalidate policies such as racial 
segregation in public schools, the denial of voting rights to African-Americans, and racially 
exclusive public accommodations.  It also extends to protect the rights of other groups, such 
as immigrants, ethnic minorities, and women.”). 
 140. But see, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (finding that segregation in 
Texas law schools violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 141. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 684. 
 142. Id. 
 143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 684. 
 145. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 685–90. 
 147. Id. at 686–87. 
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type of discrimination at issue?148  (3) Does the government action meet the 
level of scrutiny?149  In other words, does the government have a sufficiently 
strong reason for the classification, and is the action appropriately tailored to 
furthering that interest?  This section will first discuss the three different 
types of scrutiny used by reviewing courts and will then consider how courts 
have treated sexual orientation in the equal protection context. 
a.  Three Levels of Scrutiny 
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational-basis review.150  To survive an 
equal protection challenge, a government action must simply be rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.151  Because this standard is 
extremely deferential,152 the vast majority of actions are upheld under 
rational-basis review.153  Rational-basis review is used for all challenges that 
do not involve one of a limited set of suspect classes, as discussed below.  
The Supreme Court has applied rational-basis review to laws that create 
classifications on the basis of, among other categories, socioeconomic 
status,154 disability,155 and age.156 
The next-highest level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.157  After years 
of grappling with what level of scrutiny to apply to gender classifications,158 
the Court finally announced a standard in Craig v. Boren159:  intermediate 
scrutiny.160  The Court held that to pass constitutional muster, gender 
classifications must serve “important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”161  The Court 
seemed to alter the standard in United States v. Virginia162—Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion held that the government must demonstrate “an 
exceedingly persuasive justification” for that action,163 which many scholars 
 
 148. Id. at 687–89. 
 149. Id. at 689–90. 
 150. Id. at 688. 
 151. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
 152. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“The constitutional 
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the State’s objective.  State legislatures are presumed to have acted within 
their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.  
Statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it.”). 
 153. LAPIDUS ET AL., supra note 139, at 4. 
 154. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). 
 155. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). 
 156. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976). 
 157. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 687. 
 158. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).  But see, e.g., Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). 
 159. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 160. Id. at 197. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 163. Id. at 531 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). 
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interpret as raising the bar even higher for gender classifications.164  
Intermediate scrutiny is used primarily in the gender context.165 
The highest level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny.166  Under strict scrutiny, a 
government classification will be allowed only if it is narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling government interest.167  In this unforgiving analysis, the 
government must demonstrate that its compelling goal cannot be 
accomplished through any less discriminatory method.168  Strict scrutiny 
applies to all racial classifications169—even if they are intended to benefit 
minorities, such as affirmative action programs170—as well as alienage 
classifications.171 
b.  Sexual Orientation in the Equal Protection Context 
The Court has discussed disparate treatment of people based on their 
sexual orientation on a handful of occasions.  Although the Court has not 
explicitly treated sexual orientation as a suspect class meriting a higher level 
of scrutiny than rational basis review, the arc of the cases suggests application 
of some heightened scrutiny.  This section offers a brief review of these cases 
to illustrate how a court might treat a student-plaintiff’s equal protection 
claim based on sexual-orientation discrimination. 
In Romer v. Evans,172 the Court considered a challenge to a Colorado state 
constitutional amendment.173  The amendment, adopted in a 1992 statewide 
referendum, prohibited any form of government action—legislative, 
executive, or judicial—intended to protect lesbian, gay, or bisexual people 
from discrimination.174  The Colorado Supreme Court relied on federal 
voting-rights cases to find that the amendment infringed on the fundamental 
 
 164. See LAPIDUS ET AL., supra note 139, at 7. 
 165. Id. at 6. 
 166. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 687. 
 167. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 170. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (upholding 
an affirmative action program while acknowledging that strict scrutiny is the proper standard 
of review and that not all affirmative action programs will withstand muster under that 
exacting standard). 
 171. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 172. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 173. Id. at 623. 
 174. The amendment read: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.  
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any 
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, 
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, 
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or 
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim 
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.  
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing. 
Id. at 624. 
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right of LGB175 people to participate in the political process.176  Because the 
amendment infringed on a fundamental right, the Colorado Supreme Court 
applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the amendment.177  The U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment, but on different 
grounds.178  The Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado court’s rejection 
of the petitioners’ argument that rather than “put[ting] gays and lesbians in 
the same position as all other persons,” the amendment actually did “no more 
than deny homosexuals special rights.”179  Rather than focusing on 
fundamental rights, though, the Supreme Court invalidated the amendment 
using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180  The 
Court did not specifically address whether heightened scrutiny should apply 
to sexual orientation as a class; the Court seemed to skirt the question by 
holding that “even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most 
deferential of standards”—rational-basis review—the amendment fails 
because it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.181  Even 
if the decision is viewed as nominally applying rational-basis review, some 
commentators see “rational basis with bite” or “rational basis plus”—a 
heightened level of scrutiny that suggests the Court may view sexual 
orientation as a suspect class meriting additional protection.182  However, the 
magnitude of the discrimination in Romer may have been the deciding factor:  
“lower courts have consistently distinguished Romer on the basis of the 
distinctive breadth of the harm inflicted by [the amendment at issue].”183  In 
any case, Romer was the first time the Court used equal protection to protect 
people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.184  
Additionally, “Romer establishe[d] that animus against gays and lesbians, 
even when presented as a purported ‘moral’ basis for a law, is not sufficient 
to meet the rational basis test.”185 
The Court next addressed sexual orientation in Lawrence v. Texas.186  
When Houston police responded to a reported weapons disturbance, they saw 
petitioner John Lawrence engaged in a consensual sexual act with another 
 
 175. The acronym LGB is used here because the amendment did not refer to transgender 
individuals. See id. 
 176. Id. at 625. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 626.  Note that such an argument could be advanced in the context of private 
school admissions.  The precedent set in Romer would likely quash such an attempt. 
 180. Id. at 631–36. 
 181. Id. at 632. 
 182. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 
(2011) (“Romer has been read as a ‘rational basis with bite’ case.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 135, at 808 (“[T]he decision indicates at least some judicial willingness to protect 
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination.”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of 
Rational Basis with Bite:  Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of 
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2769, 2770 (2005). 
 183. Yoshino, supra note 182, at 778. 
 184. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 808. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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man.187  Both men were arrested and convicted of violating a Texas statute 
prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same 
sex.”188  The trial court rejected the petitioners’ equal protection 
challenge.189  The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District also 
rejected the challenge after considering arguments under both the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.190  The court of appeals relied on Bowers v. Hardwick,191 a 
Supreme Court case that upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy 
altogether.192  However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the reliance 
on Bowers.193  Noting that both the Texas and Georgia sodomy laws 
implicated the fundamental right to privacy,194 the Court held that a state 
cannot prohibit private, consensual homosexual activity, overturning Bowers 
in the process.195  Because the Court felt compelled to address Bowers, it 
chose to render its decision under the Due Process Clause and not the Equal 
Protection Clause.196  Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that “[e]quality of 
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected 
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects”197 
and again signaled an intention to prevent sexual-orientation 
discrimination.198 
In United States v. Windsor,199 the Court considered a provision of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).200  Section 3 of DOMA, enacted in 1996, 
defines marriage, for the purposes of federal law, as a union between one 
man and one woman.201  Edie Windsor wed her wife, Thea Spyer, in Canada 
in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by their home state of New 
 
 187. Id. at 562–63. 
 188. Id. at 563 (quoting the Texas statute). 
 189. See id. at 563. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 192. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 566. 
 193. See id. at 578. 
 194. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (considering the fundamental 
right to privacy). 
 195. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79. 
 196. Id. at 574–75 (“As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and 
some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under 
the Equal Protection Clause.  That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case 
requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity.  Were we to hold the 
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition 
would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and 
different-sex participants.”).  Kenji Yoshino argues that, although deciding the case on equal 
protection grounds would have allowed the Court to avoid the admission of error required by 
overturning Bowers, the Court declined to do so partially in order to avoid declaring the level 
of scrutiny that should apply to a sexual orientation equal protection challenge. See Yoshino, 
supra note 182, at 777–78. 
 197. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 198. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 182, at 779 (“Indeed, Lawrence arguably more 
resoundingly endorses the equality of gay and straight individuals than does Romer.”). 
 199. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 200. Id. at 2682. 
 201. Id. at 2683. 
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York.202  However, because federal law did not recognize same-sex marriage 
under DOMA, the federal government imposed over $363,000 in taxes when 
Spyer died and left her estate to Windsor.203  The district court held that 
section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, and the Second Circuit affirmed 
after applying heightened scrutiny based on the sexual-orientation 
classification.204  The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit on the 
grounds that defining marriage was the purview of state governments and 
that DOMA “violate[d] basic due process and equal protection principles.”205  
Once again, the Court avoided the question of what level of scrutiny should 
apply to a sexual-orientation equal protection challenge by stating that the 
statute had “no legitimate purpose” because “no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”206  
Nonetheless, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s repeated talk of dignity207 and 
sweeping language about equality208 further supplemented the trend toward 
treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Finally, the Court interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing marriage 
equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.209  The Obergefell appeal came from 
fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were 
deceased.210  The petitioners challenged the Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Tennessee laws restricting marriage to a union between one man and one 
woman.211  Each of the petitioners originally won the right to marry in their 
respective district courts, but the states appealed the decisions.212  The Sixth 
Circuit consolidated the various cases during the appeals process and 
overturned the judgments in favor of permitting gay marriage.213  The 
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision and held that same-sex 
marriage bans violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.214  Justice Kennedy did not explicitly ground his 
decision exclusively in either a due process or equal protection rationale; 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 2684. 
 205. Id. at 2693. 
 206. Id. at 2696. 
 207. See, e.g., id. at 2688, 2692–93. 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 2694 (“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code.”). 
 209. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 210. Id. at 2593. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 2604–05. (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of 
the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.  The 
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.  No 
longer may this liberty be denied to them.”). 
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rather, he treated the two as necessarily intertwined.215  Like the three 
preceding decisions, the Obergefell opinion “did not use the magic words of 
‘heightened scrutiny.’”216  Nonetheless, the substance of the opinion clearly 
indicates some level of scrutiny beyond rational basis.217  For example, the 
Court goes to great lengths to detail the history of discrimination against 
LGBT people,218 the immutable nature of sexual orientation,219 and the lack 
of political power of LGBT people,220 all of which are factors utilized by the 
Court when performing a heightened-scrutiny analysis, but not a rational-
basis review.221 
c.  A Student-Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim 
The Romer-Obergefell line of cases suggests that a reviewing court would 
apply some level of heightened scrutiny to a student-plaintiff’s equal 
protection claim.  None of the cases appear to apply true rational-basis 
review, under which virtually any government action can survive as long as 
some conceivable government interest is at play.  If heightened scrutiny is 
applied, a student-plaintiff may well prevail—the weight of his or her interest 
in being free from discrimination could tip the scales in his or her favor. 
Nonetheless, success is far from certain for a student-plaintiff.  Even 
though the Romer-Obergefell line of cases suggests application of heightened 
scrutiny, the outcome may depend on the context; notably, none of the 
Romer-Obergefell cases dealt with a private, religious organization such as a 
parochial school, which has a significant free-exercise interest.  Furthermore, 
the Court still has not explicitly designated sexual orientation as a suspect 
class that would merit heightened scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.  
This ambiguity leaves room for an interpreting court to apply back-to-basics, 
heavily deferential rational-basis review.  Given the extreme deference of 
that standard, a student-plaintiff’s claim would likely fail under that analysis.  
Even under a fuzzy “rational basis plus” review, there is no guarantee that a 
student-plaintiff would prevail, given the unclear boundaries of such a 
review. 
2.  The State Action Prong 
Even assuming a student-plaintiff does have a viable equal protection 
claim against a school, the student-plaintiff must jump over the state action 
 
 215. See Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last Marriage, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1, 53 (2015) (interpreting Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion to mean “that no choice between 
due process and equal protection analysis need be made, because as [Justice Kennedy] sees 
the Constitution, these two constitutional clauses are inextricably tied together under the 
umbrella of personal dignity”). 
 216. Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell Decision:  
Equal Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 11 (2016). 
 217. See id. 
 218. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 23–24. 
 219. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 28–29. 
 220. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 37–38. 
 221. See Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 22–41. 
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hurdle in order to make a viable claim.  As a general rule, the constitutional 
obligation of equal protection only applies to the government.222  In other 
words, the Constitution in isolation does not generally prohibit 
discrimination by private actors, like private schools.223  Thus, in order for a 
student-plaintiff to succeed on an equal protection claim, the student-plaintiff 
must be able to demonstrate that the private school’s action implicated the 
state such that the action of the school can fairly be treated as the action of 
the state.224  This concept is known as the “state action” doctrine—
constitutional protections apply only where the state225 is acting.  This 
section outlines the Supreme Court’s treatment of the state action doctrine, 
both in general and in contexts particularly relevant to, or similar to, voucher 
schools. 
a.  History and Development of the Doctrine 
The state action doctrine has a long history—its roots are typically traced 
back to the Civil Rights Cases.226  Since then, state action jurisprudence has 
developed to become notoriously convoluted and inconsistent.227  
Historically, the Court has found state action in only two circumstances:  
(1) where a private actor is providing a public function that is “traditionally 
[and] exclusively reserved to the State,”228 or (2) where there is significant 
 
 222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519. 
 223. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519.  There are exceptions.  For example, the 
Thirteenth Amendment regulates private conduct by forbidding slavery. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United 
States . . . .”).  Of course, Congress or state legislatures can enact statutes that subject private 
conduct to the same constitutional norms that apply to the government. CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 135, at 519. 
 224. The analysis of whether the school’s action was “under color of law” per 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 merges with the search for state action. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 
n.7 (1966) (“In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the 
same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 225. In this context, “state” is a general term referring to all levels of government—federal, 
state, and local. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519. 
 226. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial 
discrimination in certain places of public accommodation or amusement).  However, the 
doctrine was actually referenced in two earlier cases:  United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 
542 (1875), and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). See Terri Peretti, Constructing the 
State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–76 (2010); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507–508 (1985).  For 
further discussion of the history of the state action doctrine, which highlights the ways in 
which the modern doctrine does not comport with historical legal thinking, see CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 135, at 524, which explains that when the Constitution was written, it did not apply 
to private conduct because “it was thought that the common law completely safeguarded 
personal liberties from private infringements.” 
 227. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state 
have not been a model of consistency.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword:  “State Action,” 
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling 
state action a “conceptual disaster area”). 
 228. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). 
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state entanglement in the private action, that is, where the state itself actively 
encouraged or compelled the specific conduct in question229 or where “there 
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of 
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that 
of the State itself.”230  The entanglement approach essentially evaluates 
whether the government directly exerted control over the action in question. 
The public-function approach has very rarely been successful.231  
Providing utilities,232 providing education services,233 managing 
intercollegiate athletics,234 and coordinating U.S. involvement in the 
Olympics235 have all been rejected by the Supreme Court as not sufficiently 
traditional or exclusive functions of the state to qualify as a public 
function.236  The entanglement approach has also found limited success.237  
In general, successful entanglement cases tend to fall into four areas238:  
judicial and law enforcement actions,239 government licensing,240 direct 
government subsidies,241 and voter initiatives permitting discrimination.242  
However, the Court has made clear that entanglement does not exist solely 
 
 229. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“Our holdings indicate that 
where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have ‘significantly involved 
itself with invidious discriminations’ in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the 
ambit of the constitutional prohibition.” (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 
(1967))); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (“[A] State is responsible 
for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”). 
 230. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351). 
 231. See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1995) (describing “significant curtailment of the public 
function theory”); Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public?  State Action in the Era of 
Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 203, 211 (2001) 
(noting that the original public-function case, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), “has 
been so strictly limited as to suggest a very narrow scope indeed for the public function test”). 
 232. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358. 
 233. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (1982). 
 234. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197–99 (1988). 
 235. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987). 
 236. Maren Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State Action:  Charter Schools and § 1983, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1259 (2011).  But see, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988) 
(finding that the provision of medical services in a state prison is a public function, which 
renders the treating physician a state actor). 
 237. Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260. 
 238. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 539. 
 239. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1948) (holding that courts cannot 
enforce racially restrictive covenants). 
 240. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding that, 
where the city operated a parking facility that leased space to a private, discriminatory 
restaurant, the discrimination constituted state action due to the government’s involvement). 
 241. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974) (finding that state 
action may exist where the city gave racially segregated private schools exclusive use of public 
recreational facilities); see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470–71 (1973). 
 242. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (finding that the government’s 
encouragement of a ballot initiative repealing open housing laws was unconstitutional). 
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on the basis of public funding243 or extensive state regulation.244  There must 
be additional factors suggesting government encouragement or direct 
facilitation of unconstitutional conduct.245 
b.  State Action Cases in the School Context 
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the question of how a typical 
voucher program affects the private character of a school in a student’s 
discrimination suit.  However, three recent cases provide relevant insight into 
how the Court may consider such a case. 
The Court considered the public funding of a discriminatory private school 
in Norwood v. Harrison.246  In Norwood, parents of four black children 
challenged a state-run textbook-lending program in Mississippi that provided 
free textbooks to public and private schools across the state, including private 
schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies.247  Here, there was 
clear state action:  the state provided direct financial support in the form of 
free textbooks.  Even though there was no indication that the state encouraged 
the schools to discriminate or that there was other government entanglement, 
the Court found that providing financial support via textbooks was enough to 
constitute a violation of the students’ equal protection rights.248  The Court 
noted that it has “consistently affirmed decisions enjoining state tuition 
grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools”249 and 
found no meaningful distinction between tuition grants and textbooks.250  
The Court highlighted that “discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive 
influence on the entire educational process” and that although “private bias 
is not barred by the Constitution . . . neither can it call on the Constitution for 
material aid from the State.”251  Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument 
that the intention of fostering quality education for all students (by ensuring 
that students whose parents chose to send them to a discriminatory school 
would not miss out on the benefits of the free textbooks) did not overcome 
the discriminatory effect of the program.252  However, the Court was careful 
to note that not all government support of discriminatory private schools was 
 
 243. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–42 (1982) (finding that, in an employment 
discrimination suit where the state had no power to regulate personnel, near-complete reliance 
on state funding did not amount to a close enough nexus to constitute state action). 
 244. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974). 
 245. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 544–51. 
 246. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
 247. Id. at 457. 
 248. See id. at 463–64. 
 249. Id. at 463 (listing cases). 
 250. Id. at 463–64. 
 251. Id. at 469. 
 252. Id. at 466–67 (“[G]ood intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the 
State’s involvement in violation of a constitutional duty.”).  This clear statement should 
preclude a discriminatory voucher-accepting private school from successfully using an 
identical argument. 
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prohibited.253  Notably, the Court did not address how much it weighed the 
direct nature of the state aid in the Mississippi textbook program, leaving 
open the question of whether indirect state aid, such as vouchers, may be 
treated differently. 
The Court next considered public funding in the private school context in 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.254  New Perspectives School was a private, not-for-
profit institution that specialized in educating students who had trouble 
completing a public high school degree, often due to drug or alcohol 
problems or other special needs.255  When students were referred to the 
school by city or state officials, the municipalities funded the students’ tuition 
at New Perspectives.256  In the years leading up to the litigation, virtually all 
students at New Perspectives were referrals, so state funding accounted for 
between 90 and 99 percent of the school’s operating budget.257  Several 
teachers and the petitioner, a guidance counselor, voiced opposition to a 
school policy.258  When they were subsequently fired, they brought suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of their due process and First 
Amendment rights.259  Relying on Blum v. Yaretsky,260 the Court held that 
receipt of public funds alone was not enough to find state action.261  Using 
the framework from Blum, the Court was looking for “coercive power”262 
from the state with regards to the particular issue at hand—in this case, the 
personnel decision.  The Court also analogized a private school to an 
infrastructure or defense contractor: 
The school . . . is not fundamentally different from many private 
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, 
bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government.  Acts of such 
private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their 
significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.263 
Furthermore, the Court rejected the public-function argument, finding that 
while “the education of maladjusted high school students is a public 
function,” it is not the “exclusive province of the State.”264  The Court further 
noted that “the State had not undertaken to provide education for students 
who could not be served by traditional public schools.”265 
 
 253. Id. at 465 (“We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional duty merely 
because it has provided any form of state service that benefits private schools said to be racially 
discriminatory.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 254. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
 255. Id. at 832. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 833–35. 
 259. Id. at 834–35. 
 260. 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (finding no state action where staff at a nursing facility that 
received state Medicaid funds recommended the discharge or transfer of patients without 
control or regulation by the state). 
 261. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840. 
 262. Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004). 
 263. Id. at 840–41. 
 264. Id. at 842. 
 265. Id. 
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In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n,266 
the Court did not address public funding of a private school, but the case 
provides useful insight because it seemed to signal a slightly new approach 
to state action generally.267  Brentwood Academy (“Brentwood”), a private 
school outside Nashville, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a not-for-profit 
organization that coordinated sports competitions among public and private 
high schools in Tennessee.268  In 1997, the TSSAA placed Brentwood on 
probation for violating a rule against “undue influence” in recruiting 
athletes.269  Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that the TSSAA was a 
state actor and that its enforcement of the rule was a violation of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.270  The district court ruled in favor of Brentwood, 
and the Sixth Circuit reversed after finding no state action under any of the 
traditional frameworks.271  On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the 
Sixth Circuit by eschewing the rationale that state action could be found only 
under the traditional, structured approach of past cases.272  The Court noted 
the long-standing precedent that “the character of a legal entity is determined 
neither by its expressly private characterization in statutory law, nor by the 
failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from recognized 
government officials or agencies.”273  The Court went on to emphasize that 
a state action analysis is a “necessarily fact-bound inquiry”274 and morphed 
the nexus-entanglement approach into a flexible, fact-based inquiry that 
Justice David Souter referred to as “entwinement.”275  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that, although the public-function and nexus-entanglement 
precedents may be a helpful guide, the Court is not limited to finding state 
action only in those narrow circumstances.276  The Court found significant 
that the TSSAA was staffed and operated almost entirely by public school 
officials,277 state board of education members served ex officio on the board 
of the TSSAA,278 and TSSAA employees were eligible for state retirement 
benefits.279 
 
 266. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 267. See Hulden, supra note 236, at 1263. 
 268. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291. 
 269. Id. at 293. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 293–94. 
 272. Id. 294–302. 
 273. Id. at 296 (citing Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)). 
 274. Id. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)). 
 275. See id. at 291; Hulden, supra note 236, at 1262–64. 
 276. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301–04 (“Facts that address any of [the] criteria [of the public 
function or coercion tests] are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be applied. . . .  
[T]he implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom 
large under a different test.”). 
 277. Id. at 300 (“There would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible, without 
the public school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the 
purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practical terms.”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
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c.  Private Schools as State Actors Under Current Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence is not promising for a 
student-plaintiff because a public-function argument is almost certain to fail 
as a matter of course.  Public function applies only in very rare scenarios 
because, although the government performs many functions, few have been 
exclusively the purview of the state.280  There is a long history of private 
schooling in the United States, so the public-function argument has found 
little success in court.281  Nor is there much hope for the traditional 
entanglement argument.  Nothing suggests that states compel or encourage 
private schools to maintain discriminatory admissions policies. 
Even using Brentwood’s flexible, fact-based approach, direct application 
of recent state action precedent suggests that a court would not find state 
action in a student-plaintiff’s claim.  Rendell-Baker made clear that public 
funding alone is not sufficient to render a private entity’s action state action, 
even when the public funding is responsible for virtually the entire operating 
budget of the private entity.282  Nor is a private entity’s governance by state 
regulations in and of itself enough to establish state action,283 so a state’s 
limited regulatory oversight of private schools would not suffice.  The 
regulations that do govern private schools tend to relate to educational 
standards, not admissions policies, and courts primarily consider whether 
regulation exists in the specific area at issue.284  By analogizing a private 
school to any other business that contracts with the government, Rendell-
Baker suggests that the Court will not treat the educational context as a 
unique one that merits special treatment.285  Further, a student-plaintiff’s 
claim would be distinguishable from the facts of Brentwood—by nature, 
most private schools lack public-official involvement, which is a factor the 
Brentwood Court weighed heavily.286 
Finally, although the Court prohibited direct federal aid to a racially 
discriminatory private school in Norwood v. Harrison, the indirect nature of 
voucher funding could prove problematic for a student-plaintiff.  The Court 
has not clarified whether the funding is “cleansed” for equal protection 
purposes by passing through the hands of parents before going to schools, 
 
 280. See, e.g., Hulden, supra note 236, at 1259, 1266. 
 281. See Cory A. DeCresenza, Note, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the State-
Actor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 471, 498–99 (2009); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); 
Makofsky, supra note 6, at 970 (noting that the Court has declined to find education to be an 
exclusively public function “because private schools have long existed alongside public 
education”). 
 282. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840; see also Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260 n.89. 
 283. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (“The mere fact that a 
business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State 
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260 n.90. 
 284. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841–42. 
 285. Id. at 840–41. 
 286. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001); 
see supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text. 
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but the precedent set in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in the Establishment 
Clause context suggests that it could be. 
In summary, chances are slim that a court would find state action in a 
student-plaintiff’s equal protection claim against a private school.  Courts are 
hesitant to find state action in the first place, and precedent suggests that they 
would be especially hesitant to find state action in this context.  Because a 
student-plaintiff would need to show a violation of equal protection and 
establish that the private school is a state actor, it is unlikely that a student-
plaintiff would have a successful case under the U.S. Constitution. 
C.  Federal Antidiscrimination Law Does Not Sufficiently Protect 
LGBT Students 
Finally, a student-plaintiff may turn to federal antidiscrimination law in an 
attempt to find vindication.  Unlike constitutional law, federal legislation 
typically does apply to private actors.287  Federal antidiscrimination law 
covers a range of contexts, from employment to voting rights.288  The 
contexts relevant to a rejected LGBT student are (1) education, and (2) the 
making and enforcement of contracts, since private school admission is 
simply a contract between the parents and the school.  Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) governs discrimination in 
education.289  Title IX contains no provision prohibiting discrimination based 
on sexual orientation.290  Additionally, Title IX directs that the statutory 
protections do not apply to primary or secondary school admissions.291 
Discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts is governed by 
42 U.S.C. § 1981.292  It contains no provision prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.293  In short, Congress has enacted no relevant 
law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, so a 
student-plaintiff would find no protection in federal antidiscrimination 
law.294 
 
 287. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79.  Of course, the federal legislative power is not 
unlimited.  Congress must act according to an enumerated power. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 135, at 238. 
 288. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978 (“The forums that federal antidiscrimination laws 
cover include:  voting rights, access to public facilities and accommodations, discrimination 
in education, discrimination within federally assisted programs, discrimination in 
employment, and discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.”). 
 289. 20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
 290. See Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79. 
 291. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); infra Part IV.B. 
 292. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”). 
 293. See id.; see also Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79. 
 294. See Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79. 
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III.  PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR LGBT STUDENTS 
As it stands, LGBT students are vulnerable to being victims of 
discrimination at the hands of private schools.  Despite the fact that taxpayer 
dollars fund students’ vouchers, private schools have an unchecked license 
to deny admission to or expel LGBT students solely based on their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.  No state law, constitutional provision, or 
federal law prevents this brutal discrimination.295  Action is needed to ensure 
that LGBT students are treated with the same dignity as their heterosexual 
peers.  Part III.A describes why protections are necessary and logical.  Part 
III.B explains two potential ways students could obtain protection:  
(1) Congress could mold Title IX to cover sexual orientation; or (2) a student-
plaintiff could bring an equal protection claim and argue for a relaxed 
application of the state action doctrine. 
A.  Why Preventing Discrimination Is Logical and Necessary 
Preventing school-admissions discrimination is essential to protecting the 
health and success of LGBT children296 and is a natural extension of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.297 
1.  Protections Are Necessary 
Discrimination against LGBT people is highly problematic in general,298 
but it is especially despicable in the context of school voucher programs.  
Courts have long recognized the virtually unmatched societal importance of 
education.299  School is where children learn a vast range of skills necessary 
to survive in modern society, from social skills and empathy to creative 
thinking and problem-solving.300  The unique instructional nature of a school 
demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Rendell-Baker Court’s attempt to 
analogize private school admission to any other business contract.301  
Unequal access to education can fundamentally handicap a child in a way 
that no regular business contract can. 
Courts should consider the unique importance of the educational 
environment in any analysis involving a school, but especially in the context 
of school voucher programs.  In the voucher context, allowing sexual-
orientation discrimination to persist may be tantamount to relegating LGBT 
students to an inferior education given that many voucher programs develop 
 
 295. See supra Part II. 
 296. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 297. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 298. See supra Part I.B. 
 299. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[I]t is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.”). 
 300. See Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children:  
Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 513–14 
(2002); see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 301. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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in response to failing public schools.302  It is not difficult to imagine a rural 
setting in which a voucher program developed in response to an inadequate 
public school system and where few private schools exist.  If the one or two 
participating private schools in the area have discriminatory policies, LGBT 
students will be forced to accept an education that the government itself has 
acknowledged is inadequate by establishing a voucher program to provide 
alternative options to public schooling. 
In addition to the destructive educational consequences of discrimination, 
prohibiting LGBT students from having equal access to schooling 
opportunities may have traumatic sociopsychological effects.303  The school 
environment plays a formative role in a child’s sociopsychological 
development.304  Rejection in the school environment is uniquely 
damaging.305  The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that allowing 
schools to discriminate gives the disfavored population the degrading mark 
of institutionalized inferiority.306  Being rejected from a school because of 
sexual orientation, or even the knowledge that one could be rejected based 
on sexual orientation, may contribute to a vast range of negative outcomes 
for LGBT children, including higher risk of drug use, higher risk of suicidal 
ideation, and lower rates of academic success.307 
2.  Protections Are Logical 
The Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork for instituting 
protections for LGBT students, and doing so in this context would not be a 
major departure from the Court’s jurisprudence.  First, the Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged that discrimination has no place in education.  In 
Norwood v. Harrison, the Court explicitly acknowledged that “[f]ree 
textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form 
of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools 
themselves” and held it unconstitutional for the government to provide 
financial support to racially discriminatory schools.308  Vouchers are exactly 
the kind of tuition grant the Court referred to when stating that government 
aid that goes to discriminatory schools is constitutionally problematic.  
Although the facts of the case involved racial discrimination, Norwood 
makes several broadly disapproving statements about discrimination 
generally and suggests that the reasoning in the opinion could apply to other 
 
 302. See, e.g., Oluwole & Green, supra note 52, at 1337 (“Given many Americans’ 
dissatisfaction with their local public schools, some municipalities have looked to 
vouchers . . . to help fund their children’s education at private schools.”).  See generally 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 303. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 304. See generally Orly Rachmilovitz, No Queer Child Left Behind, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 203 
(2017). 
 305. See id. at 220–24. 
 306. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).  Although the scope and vitriol 
of racial school segregation is unmatched, the principle still holds when applied to the 
exclusion of LGBT students from private schools. 
 307. See Rachmilovitz, supra note 304, at 204–05. 
 308. 413 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1973). 
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forms of discrimination.309  Preventing state-sponsored discrimination 
against LGBT students—even if the state aid at issue is provided indirectly 
via parental choice—is a logical outgrowth of Norwood. 
Another seminal school discrimination case, Runyon v. McCrary,310 also 
supports this conclusion.  In Runyon, parents of two African American 
students challenged a private school’s policy against admitting black 
students.311  The Supreme Court resoundingly rejected the school’s freedom 
of association,312 parental rights,313 and privacy314 defenses and held that the 
admissions policy was a violation of the students’ constitutional rights.315  
Runyon makes clear that imposing antidiscrimination requirements on 
private schools is constitutional.  Thus, the Court has shown a willingness to 
curtail private schools’ discriminatory policies and block public funding of 
discriminatory schools.  Extending these holdings to prevent schools from 
discriminating against LGBT students, or at least to prevent public dollars 
from going to such schools, is a natural next step. 
Furthermore, instituting protections for LGBT students would promote 
important government interests.  First, as evidenced in Runyon and Norwood, 
eliminating discrimination is itself an important state interest.316  Second, the 
government has a vested interest in instilling children with certain universal 
values; in fact, this is one of the primary purposes of public education.317  
Preventing sexual-orientation discrimination would communicate to children 
the importance of empathy, respect, tolerance, equality, and diversity, which 
at least one scholar argues are central to the purpose of publicly funded 
education.318 
B.  How LGBT Students Could Obtain Protection 
This section considers two potential options for providing LGBT students 
with much-needed protection from discrimination.  First, Title IX could be 
molded to include protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  Second, a student-plaintiff could bring a federal constitutional 
claim and argue for a relaxed approach to the state action doctrine, such that 
a private school would be treated as a state actor and a student-plaintiff could 
 
 309. See, e.g., id. at 469 (“[D]iscriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the 
entire educational process.”); see also id. at 463 (“That the Constitution may compel toleration 
of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support 
for such discrimination.”). 
 310. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 311. Id. at 163–64. 
 312. Id. at 175–76. 
 313. Id. at 176–77. 
 314. Id. at 178 (“The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional 
right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools 
that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children 
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”). 
 315. Id. at 186. 
 316. See Kavey, supra note 48, at 766. 
 317. See Shiffrin, supra note 300, at 513. 
 318. Id. 
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proceed with an equal protection claim.  This Note ultimately argues that an 
equal protection claim is the most viable option. 
1.  Mold Title IX to Cover Sexual Orientation 
One potential way to protect LGBT students would be for Congress to alter 
existing antidiscrimination legislation.  Title IX would be a logical place to 
locate protections for LGBT students, since it already outlaws discrimination 
in education based on sex.319  If federal support for voucher programs were 
to increase, participating schools would likely be subject to Title IX since 
federal grant money is considered an applicable form of “federal financial 
assistance” for the purposes of Title IX.320  Establishing LGBT protections 
under Title IX could occur in one of two ways, both of which require two 
steps:  (1) amend § 1681(a)(1) within Title IX and judicially interpret “sex” 
to include “sexual orientation,” as has been done in the employment 
context,321 or (2) amend § 1681(a)(1) and also amend the body of Title IX to 
explicitly, textually prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination. 
To utilize Title IX to protect LGBT students in elementary schools and 
high schools, § 1681(a)(1) would need to be amended.  The provision 
currently states:  “in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this 
section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional 
education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of 
undergraduate higher education.”322  Primary and secondary schools are 
notably absent from the list.  The exclusion of primary and secondary schools 
was intended to ensure that single-sex schools could continue to operate.323  
Amending § 1681(a)(1) to protect LGBT students need not disturb that goal.  
The amendment could provide for universal application of Title IX 
regulations to primary and secondary schools, both public and private, with 
a built-in exception stating that nothing in the legislation should be 
 
 319. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”). 
 320. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether indirect federal aid could 
trigger Title IX in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  In Grove, federal grant 
money was disbursed to qualifying students, who then chose to spend their grant money at 
Grove City College, a private institution—similar to the way in which voucher money is first 
disbursed to parents, who then choose where to spend the money. Id. at 559–62.  In a sex 
discrimination suit, the Court found that the language of Title IX suggests no distinction 
between indirect and direct funding and held that indirect aid does trigger Title IX, though 
only for the specific program receiving aid. Id. at 564, 573. 
 321. See infra notes 325–32 and accompanying text. 
 322. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). 
 323. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,532 (Oct. 25, 2006) (“Title 
IX has always permitted single-sex schools under conditions that ensure nondiscrimination. 
Existing educational research suggests that single-sex education may provide benefits to some 
students under certain circumstances.”); Elizabeth S. Kisthardt, Comment, Singling Them Out:  
The Influence of the “Boy Crisis” on the New Title IX Regulations, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
313, 313 (2007) (highlighting that the original intent of Title IX was to allow for single-sex 
education). 
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interpreted to prohibit single-sex schools.324  If § 1681(a)(1) was amended to 
cover primary and secondary schools, protection for LGBT students could be 
pursued in two ways:  judicial interpretation or another statutory amendment. 
One resolution would be for courts to interpret Title IX’s ban on “sex 
discrimination” to also prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination.  Many 
scholars argue that, by definition, the prohibition of “sex discrimination” 
includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.325  Their logic is 
founded in the concept of sex stereotyping, which the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.326  Simply put, the argument 
is that the variable underlying sexual-orientation discrimination is sex:  
discrimination against a gay man is premised on the fact that he is a man, and 
men are stereotypically attracted to women.  If the sex of the target individual 
were changed, the perpetrator would have no reason to discriminate; a 
woman attracted to men does not break a sex stereotype, and therefore would 
not be the target of sexual-orientation discrimination.  No court of appeals 
has ruled on whether this logic is valid in the Title IX context, and district 
courts have come down on both sides of the issue.327  However, the same 
logic is being used successfully in Title VII cases.  Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 regulates sex discrimination in employment,328 and Title 
VII jurisprudence is regularly used to inform Title IX interpretation.329  Most 
notably, the Seventh Circuit resoundingly approved the argument in Hively 
v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,330 as did the Second Circuit in 
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.331  However, the predictive value of Hively 
 
 324. The exception could look something like 20 U.S.C. § 1686, which states:  
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, nothing contained herein 
shall be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from 
maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes.” 
 325. See, e.g., Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education:  Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment 
as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 193 
(2005) (“[S]exual orientation discrimination is a form of sex/gender discrimination.”). 
 326. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that treating someone differently because he or she does 
not comport with the stereotypes associated with his or her gender is a form of sex 
discrimination under Title VII). 
 327. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Schs., No. 12-10354, 2012 WL 2450805, at *8, 
*11 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012) (holding that “while discrimination based on noncompliance 
with sexual stereotypes may be actionable under federal law, discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is not”).  But cf. Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-cv-1491, 2012 WL 591190, 
at *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012) (“[H]arassment due to a victim’s perceived homosexuality is 
sufficient to constitute ‘sexual harassment,’ regardless of whether the victim is in fact gay.”), 
rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Cypress Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 863 
F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
 328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . 
sex.”). 
 329. See, e.g., Adele P. Kimmel, Title IX:  An Imperfect but Vital Tool to Stop Bullying of 
LGBT Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006, 2016 (2016) (“When interpreting Title IX’s prohibition 
against sex discrimination in education, courts often rely on Title VII precedent on sex 
discrimination in employment.”). 
 330. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that sexual-orientation discrimination 
is a form of sex discrimination and therefore prohibited under Title VII). 
 331. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
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and Zarda is questionable, given that the only other court of appeals to rule 
on the matter, the Eleventh Circuit, ruled the other way in Evans v. Georgia 
Regional Hospital.332 
Another resolution would be to simply amend Title IX to include an 
explicit ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Given the current 
political climate, such an amendment is unlikely.333  Besides, any resolution 
attempted through Title IX faces several challenges.  First, the text of Title 
IX allows for religious exemptions.334  By applying for an exemption, private 
elementary and high schools could participate in a voucher program and yet 
avoid compliance with Title IX’s antidiscrimination norms.335  Second, even 
without an official exemption, schools have a simple workaround that frees 
them from the burden of Title IX:  do not accept federal aid.  In fact, many 
colleges currently take this approach.336  Thus, although a Title IX approach 
may provide some benefit to LGBT students, it would not entirely eliminate 
discrimination against LGBT students in the private school admissions 
process. 
2.  The Equal Protection Claim 
The option that is most likely to successfully provide protections for an 
LGBT student is to bring an equal protection claim.  As discussed in Part 
II.B, a court faced with a student-plaintiff’s equal protection challenge would 
be unlikely to find that the voucher-receiving private school’s discrimination 
 
 332. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual-orientation discrimination is not 
prohibited under Title VII), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).  Additionally, the Trump 
Department of Justice has signaled that it will not support the Seventh and Second Circuits’ 
interpretation of Title VII. See Joseph Goldstein, Discrimination Based on Sex Is Debated in 
Case of Gay Sky Diver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/ 
nyregion/discrimination-based-on-sex-sky-diver-donald-zarda.html [https://perma.cc/RNZ6-
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opposed finding sex discrimination to include sexual-orientation discrimination). 
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Republican president in the White House. See Russell Berman, The Republican Majority in 
Congress Is an Illusion, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2017/03/the-republican-majority-in-congress-is-an-illusion/521403/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DEZ-AFEW].  For the same reason, passing new legislation outlawing 
sexual-orientation discrimination (whether in education or across the board) is a highly 
unrealistic option. 
 334. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2012) (“[T]his section shall not apply to an educational 
institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection 
would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.”); 34 C.F.R. § 106.12 
(2018). 
 335. See Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327, 
327 n.1 (2016).  As of September 2016, 245 colleges and universities had been granted Title 
IX religious exemptions. See id. 
 336. See Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason Some Religious Colleges 
Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religious-colleges-forgo-federal-funding/ 
490253/ [https://perma.cc/KYT2-5NAT]. 
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qualifies as state action.337  Thus, a student-plaintiff would need to argue for 
a relaxed approach to the state action doctrine. 
a.  Arguing for Relaxed State Action 
As a general matter, courts have historically been reluctant to find that the 
action of a private actor is state action.338  However, in at least one context, 
the Supreme Court arguably relaxed the state action doctrine in order to make 
headway regarding particularly invidious discrimination:  race 
discrimination.339  Scholars have observed that the Court has been more 
likely to find state action in claims of race discrimination.340  This trend is 
evidenced by the Court’s track record: 
[T]he Court found state action in all of the leading cases from 1940 to 1969, 
[and] all but four of [the fourteen] cases contained a race discrimination 
claim.  In contrast, nearly three-quarters of the state action cases in the 
1970s and 1980s did not involve race, and the Court found state action in 
only one of them (Lugar) and by only a one-vote margin.  Additionally, of 
the four major state action cases involving race from 1970 to 1989, the 
Court ruled in favor of the state action claim in three.341 
In addition, at least one court of appeals has explicitly held that the type of 
discrimination at issue should affect whether a court finds state action.342 
Sexual-orientation discrimination in voucher programs merits a relaxed 
state-action approach for three reasons.  First, sexual orientation shares some 
of the categorical traits that justify heightened scrutiny of racial 
classifications.  Second, in many voucher programs, private schools have 
become agents of the state.  Finally, Brentwood’s flexible approach 
constitutes a doctrinal shift and supports finding state action even outside the 
strictures of traditional approaches. 
i.  Sexual Orientation Shares Traits with Race 
The Court has identified a number of traits that warrant heightened 
scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.343  These same traits justify relaxing 
the state action doctrine to protect vulnerable groups.  Three of the primary 
traits that courts have considered are:  immutability, political powerlessness, 
and history of discrimination.344  Claims based on race have received a 
 
 337. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 338. See Hulden, supra note 236, at 1258–61. 
 339. See id. at 1259 (“The Court has been more likely to find state action . . . where the 
constitutional violation is discrimination based on race.”). 
 340. See, e.g., id. 
 341. Peretti, supra note 226, at 300–01.  Race discrimination state action claims decreased 
dramatically after 1970, largely as a result of legislative efforts to combat discrimination. Id. 
at 274–75. 
 342. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] less 
stringent standard for finding state action should be applied when racial or sexual 
discrimination is at issue . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
 343. See Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 22–23. 
 344. See id. 
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relaxed state-action approach on the basis of these traits, which also apply to 
LGBT people.345 
First, sexual orientation is immutable.  In this context, immutability refers 
to whether an individual can change the characteristic in question.  For 
example, race is considered immutable because an individual will always be 
the same race as he or she was at birth.  Logically, an immutable 
characteristic merits special protection from discrimination because an 
individual has no control over whether he or she is born with the trait.  
Opponents of gay rights claim that sexual orientation is not out of an 
individual’s control and argue that sexual orientation is a behavioral 
“choice.”346  Although sexual orientation may be considered more dynamic 
than race, it is nonetheless an inherent personal characteristic that an 
individual cannot choose.  Nuances aside, the immutability of sexual 
orientation for the purposes of the law was heartily affirmed in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.347  The Obergefell opinion repeatedly acknowledges the 
immutability of sexual orientation, both explicitly, by referring to the amicus 
curiae brief of the American Psychological Association that stated as 
much,348 and implicitly, through numerous comparisons to the bans on 
interracial marriage that were struck down in Loving v. Virginia.349 
Second, sexual-orientation minorities are significantly lacking in political 
power.  As with immutability, not everyone agrees that LGBT people lack 
political power.  Critics, such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia,350 like to 
portray LGBT people as “a sinister elite, pulling marionette strings behind 
the scenes of Hollywood and Washington, hell-bent on the destruction of 
good and normal society.”351  Given that politicians have not deigned to 
legislatively protect LGBT people in basically any context or at any level,352 
this characterization is obviously wrong.  As scholars have explained, “The 
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legislative and judicial victories achieved by gay people, largely aimed at 
dismantling oppressive and focused discrimination, do not represent ‘spoils 
of war won by a politically powerful class.  Instead, they are merely kernels 
of dignity accomplished by decades of political struggle.’”353 
Finally, it is undeniable that LGBT people have been subjected to centuries 
of discrimination and moral and legal condemnation.354  In its pre-Obergefell 
decision overturning same-sex marriage bans, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared that “homosexuals are among the most stigmatized, 
misunderstood, and discriminated-against minorities in the history of the 
world.”355  For decades, homosexuality was treated as a mental illness, and 
“[i]ndividuals with same-sex attraction were in fact routinely prescribed 
shock therapy, punishing methods of aversion therapy, and lobotomies as 
medical and psychological treatments designed to supposedly cure them of 
same-sex attraction.”356  There is a vast and vivid history of discrimination 
against LGBT people.  Therefore, LGBT people should be granted 
heightened protection. 
ii.  Voucher Schools Are Acting as Agents of the State 
One of the core components of a judicial search for state action is 
identifying scenarios in which a private actor can be said to be acting in the 
government’s stead.  This is by definition what occurs in a voucher program 
because the private school has essentially become an agent of the state.  The 
state has said:  “We have tried to provide adequate public education, but we 
have failed.  We are asking some other actors to step in and do our job for 
us.”  Of course, critics would counter that this is just an example of delegation 
of a public function that the Court has acknowledged is not exclusive to the 
state and therefore not sufficient for a finding of state action.  However, the 
delegation at issue in voucher programs is unique in that it is typically a result 
of the state’s failure to carry out a mandatory duty.  Although education is 
not a federally guaranteed fundamental right,357 every state has 
constitutionally adopted an affirmative duty to provide its citizens with an 
education.358  When states institute voucher programs in acknowledgment of 
the fact that the public schools are failing to provide an adequate education, 
they are shifting a constitutional burden to private actors.  This unique quality 
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of voucher programs justifies breaking with the requirement of exclusivity in 
a traditional public-function approach. 
iii.  Brentwood Signaled a Doctrinal Shift Toward Increased Flexibility 
in State Action Analyses 
Finally, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic 
Ass’n’s entwinement approach constituted a doctrinal shift toward a flexible, 
fact-based analysis of state action and signaled that the Court may be more 
inclined to find state action in nontraditional scenarios.359  For years, the 
Court grappled with an unwieldy set of case law in an attempt to distill clear 
rules for finding state action, without much success.  In Brentwood, Justice 
Souter seems to avoid that mess altogether and focuses on considering the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether state action exists.360  In 
the case of a student-plaintiff, although any single factor might not 
individually be sufficient under traditional approaches to the state action 
doctrine, Brentwood cracks open the door to weighing all those factors 
together.  The various factors in a student-plaintiff’s case—the unique nature 
of the school environment, the strong government interest in eradicating 
discrimination in education, public funding, and state regulatory oversight—
combine to create a weighty case for a finding of state action. 
b.  Responding to Likely Challenges from Schools 
Private schools will likely fight back against student-plaintiffs’ attempts to 
curtail the schools’ ability to discriminate.  The rights of LGBT people is one 
of the most contentious topics in the ongoing culture war between religious 
conservatives and liberal civil rights activists.361  A discussion of how to 
protect LGBT students requires briefly contemplating how opposing parties 
might attempt to defeat those protections.  This section considers two First 
Amendment defenses a private school is likely to raise when faced with a 
claim of discrimination from an LGBT student-plaintiff:  free exercise and 
freedom of association.362 
The First Amendment promises that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”363  A private school is likely to claim that being forced to accept 
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LGBT students burdens its to freely exercise religion.  This claim will likely 
fail for two reasons.  First, requiring schools to admit LGBT students does 
not mean that the schools are required to support LGBT rights.  The right of 
an LGBT student to attend an anti-LGBT school can coexist with the school’s 
right to espouse anti-LGBT views.364  Second, Supreme Court precedent 
militates in favor of a student-plaintiff.  The Court has explicitly recognized 
that the government’s heightened interests in the area of education renders 
regulation of religious schools less constitutionally problematic than 
interference with churches.365  Additionally, the Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith366 suggests that antidiscrimination laws do 
not, as a general rule, violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause as 
long as they are neutral laws of general applicability.367  The Court has 
granted religious organizations a “ministerial exception” to employment 
discrimination laws, allowing them to hire and fire religious leaders without 
government oversight.368  However, such an exception applies only to 
employees whose job it is to teach the faith or otherwise preach the religious 
mission of the organization and therefore would not apply to student 
admissions.369  These two factors suggest that a school’s free exercise 
challenge will likely fail. 
The freedom to associate stems from the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.370  The expressive value of association has been used as a 
foundation for organizations that wish to deny membership to certain groups 
of people.371  There is some uncertainty in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the interplay of discrimination and freedom of association.  The 
Court noted in Norwood v. Harrison that “[i]nvidious private discrimination 
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association 
protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections,” which seems to suggest that a freedom-of-
association defense would not defeat a discrimination claim.372  However, 
approximately twenty-five years after Norwood, such a defense did prevail 
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in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.373  In Dale, an openly gay scoutmaster 
challenged his expulsion from the group under a New Jersey 
antidiscrimination law.374  The Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts’s 
membership decisions were a form of expressive association and therefore 
protected by the First Amendment.375  A private school would likely argue 
that Dale should apply to the school’s admissions policy and that being 
forced to accept LGBT students would violate the school’s freedom of 
association.  However, this argument is likely to fail given the unique nature 
of the educational environment: 
The Dale Court . . . did not reject the possibility that sufficiently 
compelling state interests could override free speech associational rights in 
some contexts.  On the contrary, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding 
principle that the right of expressive association “is not absolute” and can 
be overridden by regulations that are narrowly tailored “to serve compelling 
state interests.”376 
The government has a significant interest in eliminating discrimination in 
education.377  This interest may be strong enough to outweigh the minimal 
burden that antidiscrimination requirements would impose on private 
schools’ expressive association rights.378 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has made much progress toward assuring that, as 
promised in the Fourteenth Amendment, all citizens receive the dignity of 
equal protection of the laws.  There is still, however, a long way to go to fully 
achieving that laudable goal.  Along with many other minority groups, LGBT 
people are still discriminated against in many facets of everyday life.  Given 
the unique importance of the educational context and the involvement of 
public tax dollars, discrimination against LGBT students in voucher 
programs is especially heinous. 
LGBT students have virtually no legal recourse if they are rejected by a 
discriminatory private school.  Neither state nor federal law provides 
sufficient protection.  Whether via judicial interpretation or federal 
legislation, something must be done to end the state-sponsored 
discrimination that occurs when voucher-accepting private schools are 
allowed to expel or reject vulnerable LGBT youth.  Action is needed to 
ensure equality. 
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